Two Fronts: Washington Escalates Against ICC and Russia Simultaneously
In a pair of significant foreign-policy moves converging around the United Nations General Assembly in late September 2026, the Trump administration is preparing to sanction the International Criminal Court as an institution — not merely its individual officials — while President Donald Trump has also signed into law sweeping new authority to impose tariffs and sanctions on Russia and Iran.
Together, the actions mark one of the most aggressive weeks of American unilateralism in recent memory, targeting both a multilateral judicial body and two adversarial states through instruments that give the White House broad discretionary power.
ICC Sanctions: From Judges to the Entire Institution
Washington's campaign against the ICC has been escalating for months. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in July 2026 a formal effort to isolate the court, calling on other nations to withdraw from the tribunal [5]. The administration had already imposed sanctions on a number of ICC judges and prosecutors [5][6]. But two sources familiar with the matter told Reuters that the administration has now prepared sanctions targeting the court itself as an institution, with an announcement expected soon [5].
The Wall Street Journal reported that officials said a final decision could come as early as the week of the UN General Assembly meeting [5][6].
The distinction between sanctioning individuals and sanctioning the entire organization is consequential. Any entity-wide designation by the US Treasury would prohibit American citizens and companies from providing funds, goods, or services to the court without a license from the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) [5]. Because banks worldwide depend on access to the American financial system, they routinely over-comply with US sanctions, amplifying their reach far beyond what the text of any executive order requires [5][6].
The ICC's own leadership has flagged the operational risks. The court's registrar and president have warned that sanctions against the institution could disrupt the purchasing of IT services and insurance, the hiring of investigators, and routine financial transactions — including paying the dozens of American citizens currently employed by the court [5][6].
Why the ICC, Why Now
The Trump administration's hostility toward the ICC is not new. Opposition dates to Trump's first term, but it intensified sharply in November 2024, when Trump was re-elected and the ICC simultaneously issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza conflict [5][6].
US officials have made two specific demands of the court: drop the arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, and abandon a past investigation into American military conduct in Afghanistan [5][6]. The ICC, established in 2002 to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, asserts jurisdiction only when a member state is unable or unwilling to prosecute atrocities itself [5]. The United States has never been a member of the court [5].
Targeting the entire organization — along with entities that cooperate with it — could, in the assessment of sources cited by Reuters, severely undermine the court's ability to function [5].
The Graham Act: A New Russia-Iran Sanctions Architecture
Separately, on September 18, 2026, Trump signed H.R. 5334, formally titled the "Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026" [1]. The legislation was originally championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham — designated as a terrorist and extremist by Russia — and had cleared both chambers of Congress before reaching the president's desk [1].
The law does not impose sanctions automatically. Instead, it grants Trump broad discretionary authority to determine the timing, rates, and scope of new economic measures [1]. Crucially, the president can also grant exemptions to specific countries without requiring prior congressional approval — a provision that gives the White House significant leverage in bilateral negotiations [1].
On the tariff side, the law authorizes additional duties of up to 100% on US imports from countries that qualify as major purchasers of Russian oil and gas and continue to buy them [1]. A separate provision establishes tariffs of up to 500% on goods of Russian origin imported directly into the United States [1].
The legislation also contains an off-ramp: Trump is empowered to lift the mandated sanctions and tariffs if conditions specified in the law are met — specifically, the conclusion of a peace deal on Ukraine and a cessation of hostilities [1]. The White House had previously described this peace-linked suspension mechanism as a central feature of the bill, alongside the president's authority to grant country-level exemptions [1].
What to Watch
Several developments in the coming days and weeks will determine how consequential these moves prove to be.
On the ICC front, the precise timing of any Treasury designation remains unclear, and the State Department had not responded to press inquiries as of the time of reporting [5]. Whether allied governments — many of whom are ICC member states — push back diplomatically will test the limits of Rubio's isolation campaign.
On Russia, the Graham Act's impact depends entirely on whether and when Trump chooses to pull the trigger on its provisions. The law's built-in flexibility — exemptions without congressional sign-off, a peace-deal escape valve — means it functions more as a loaded instrument of leverage than an automatic penalty regime. Whether that leverage is applied to accelerate Ukraine negotiations or held in reserve will be the defining question for the months ahead [1].
